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I. Introduction  
 The economic approach to the study of politics has made 
notable contributions to the theory of the state, of 
bureaucracy, and of party competition, and to the study of 
problems in preference revelation, preference aggregation, and 
the properties of voting rules.
i
  An embarrassing limitation of 
the economic approach to politics, however, is its failure to 
account for the individual decision to vote in large elections. 
 A fundamental assumption of public choice is that people 
are egoistic, rational utility maximizers (Mueller, 1989, 2).  
Since elections are rarely close enough for a single vote to 
make a crucial difference in the outcome, voting is highly 
unlikely to be an efficient use of time and resources in 
attaining one's political goals (Benn, 1979, 292).  If voting 
requires even a small investment in time and effort, "a 
reflective voter must conclude, as he is going to the polling 
place, that whatever impels him there, it is not the impact of 
his vote on the outcome" (Coleman, 1990, 289).  The problem, 
then, is to reconcile observed high rates of voting turnout with 
the rationality postulate, or alternatively to explain why 
people persist in voting in spite of its irrationality.  
 The standard political behavior literature on turnout does 
not suffer from this embarrassing failure to predicted observed 
participation levels, but has inadequate theoretical 
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grounding.  The role of "resources" such as time, money, and 
information as inputs to participation is stresses, but little 
attention is paid to the problem of voters' motivations.
ii
  The 
incentives bringing voters to the polls must be identified given 
the free-rider disincentives highlighted by the economic 
approach.  That some people have the "resources" to vote is at 
best an incomplete explanation of turnout; an entrepreneur may 
possess the resources to undertake an investment he recognizes 
would be unprofitable, but will clearly refrain from doing so.  
A focus on resources is further undercut by empirical findings 
in the turnout literature.  The unemployed, who have the most 
"free" time (or the lowest opportunity cost of time, from an 
economist's point of view), vote at significantly lower rates 
than the employed, even when differences in education and other 
relevant variables are controlled for (Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone, 1980).   
  
II. Voter Turnout and The Logic of Collective Action 
 That the decision to vote cannot in general be accounted 
for by any expected impact on political outcomes can be viewed 
as an illustration of Olson's logic of collective action: one's 
contribution to a collective good will result in an increase 
in the public goods benefits accruing to the contributor too 
small to cover the costs of the contribution.  Olson's (1965) 
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by-product theory of collective action argued that any 
contribution by a rational self-interested individual toward 
a public good must be the result of private or selective 
incentives received in exchange for the contribution, since the 
individual receives the benefits of the public good 
independently of that contribution.   
 Material incentives have often had an important role in 
inducing turnout, especially in the case of "machine politics" 
predominating in the U.S. in earlier periods and in certain 
other countries today.  Political machines are structured so 
that "party hacks" are rewarded by the organization for their 
success in turning out voters, who are often supplied with 
transportation to the polls, and offered cash, jobs, contracts, 
or government services in exchange for their votes (Uhlaner, 
1986, 562; Barry, 1970, 35; Olson, 1965, 164-165).  Material 
rewards such as cash or patronage surely account for only a tiny 
portion of turnout in contemporary American national elections, 
however, pointing to the importance of "solidary" and 
"purposive" incentives:  
 
"Solidary incentives are intangible costs and benefits of 
a social nature deriving, for example, from friendship, 
camaraderie, recreational activity, status, social 
pressure, or a sense of belonging. Purposive incentives 
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are intangible costs and benefits ultimately grounded on 
values of a suprapersonal nature, e.g., notions of right 
and wrong, moral or religious principles, political 
ideology, and notions of fairness and justice." (Moe, 
1980, 615, emphasis in original) 
 
 Uhlaner (1986, 1989a, 1989b) and Morton (1991) have 
developed models of voter participation based on purposive and 
solidary incentives.  In these models, group leaders provide 
purposive incentives, and create group structures in which 
solidary incentives can arise, in exchange for contributions 
to the group in the form of votes for the group's favored 
candidate.  A member votes if his costs of voting are less than 
the sum of his "costs" incurred in violating group participatory 
norms and his rewards gained from abiding by these norms.  The 
more one candidate is preferred by the group to the opposition, 
the more resources a leader will expend on stressing the duty 
of members to vote, thereby increasing the group's voting 
turnout.  Rewards and sanctions available to group leaders 
include "enhanced feelings of being a good person" and 
"ostracism directed against abstainers" (Uhlaner, 1989a, 398). 
  
 Uhlaner stresses the role of political parties, interest 
groups, and reference groups in mobilizing turnout through a 
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sense of group loyalty and duty, arguing (1986,  570) that 
"tendencies toward group affiliation" are "basic."  There is 
good reason to question, however, whether loyalty to these 
groups is the primary source of the widespread sense of duty 
to vote.  
 There is strong evidence that in the U.S. in the second 
half of the 19th century parties and reference groups were the 
major agents of voter mobilization (Piven and Cloward, 1988; 
Kleppner, 1982).  Party organizations have weakened 
considerably in the United States since then, however 
(Kleppner, 1982; Teixeira, 1987, ch. 1).  Survey measures of 
partisan identification indicate a severe erosion in the 
strength of party loyalties since 1960 (Miller and Traugott, 
1989, 81).   
 Dennis (1970) discovers strong support for the 
institutions of elections and for the norm of voting duty, with 
most of his Wisconsin survey respondents indicating that a 
citizen should vote even if he thinks his vote won't make a 
difference, or if he believes his party has no chance of winning, 
or if he doesn't care who wins.  On the other hand, Dennis finds 
little support for the party system.  Respondents 
overwhelmingly agreed that the parties "confuse the issues" and 
"create conflicts where none really exist" (1970, 831).  Dennis 
concludes: 
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"The average member of the public will more likely have 
internalized the norms of electoral participation than 
those of partisan competition...Voting and elections are 
'us'; parties are 'them.'" (832) 
 
A consistent 90-plus percent of National Election Studies 
respondents from 1952 to 1980 (when the item was dropped from 
the survey) disagreed with the statement, "It isn't so important 
to vote when you know your party doesn't have any chance of 
winning."  Apparently, helping to elect one's favored 
candidate is not the only reason, or even the primary reason, 
for voting for most citizens.   
 At least in the contemporary United States, a sense of 
civic duty based on affiliation with the society as a whole 
appears to be the key variable accounting for the participation 
of the many citizens without strong or exclusive loyalties to 
politically active interest groups, reference groups, or 
parties.  The group-mobilization models of Uhlaner and Morton 
suffer, in this view, from a misplaced emphasis on 
provincialism.     
 Weisberg and Grofman (1981) and Schram (1989) find support 
for a voting model in which individuals first decide whether 
or not to vote, and then decide who to vote for, contradicting 
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Uhlaner's (1986, 560) dubious assertion that "transitions 
between voting and abstaining occur more easily than those 
between voting for opposing candidates."  A two-stage model in 
which candidate evaluation takes place after the decision to 
vote is made is more consistent with a dominant role for civic 
duty to vote than with a model in which incentives to vote 
provided by group leaders vary depending on candidates' 
platforms.   
 Voting participation is not only a partisan or group public 
good; it is also widely perceived as a societal or national 
public good: sufficiently low turnouts "can conceivably cause 
democracy to break down" (Downs, 1957,  268) as highly 
unpopular candidates could be elected.  Mass political 
involvement is also believed to help keep leaders accountable 
to the citizenry: "Democratic institutions owe their survival 
to the keen participation of citizens in the life of the polity" 
(Chapman and Palda, 1983, 337).  Democratic theorists teach 
that a democracy can function well "only if a substantial part 
of its electorate exercises the right to vote, and maintains 
a political vigilance" as expressed by party activism, and by 
letters written to government representatives and newspapers 
(Benn, 1979, 292).    
This view of turnout levels as a national public good is 
supported by polling evidence.  In a nationwide ABC-Harvard 
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survey conducted in 1983, 77 percent of respondents agreed that 
"no matter who wins, the more people who go to the polls, the 
better off our democracy will be."  Nearly all of these 
indicated "a strong belief" in the statement.  Even among 
respondents who were not currently registered to vote and 
admitted that they rarely if ever voted (the "rarelies"), 61% 
agreed that higher turnout is good for the country, with more 
than 80% of these indicating a strong belief (Alderman, 1983).  
The fact that approximately one-fourth of nonvoters falsely 
report having voted to NES interviewers (Silver, Anderson, and 
Abramson, 1986) further indicates the duty to vote is primarily 
a civic norm and not a special-interested norm.   
551). 
 
III. Social Sanctions and Voter Turnout 
 The role of interpersonal pressures to vote has received 
little attention in the theoretical literature on turnout, and 
virtually none in the empirical literature.  While perhaps of 
less importance in the context of voting than "internal" 
sanctions associated with the sense of civic duty to vote, 
"external" sanctions from friends, relatives, and other 
associates appear to play a major role in overcoming collective 
action problems in other settings (see Olson, 1965).  In 
contrast to internalized restraints, which involve "processes 
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of conscience or superego, the pain of guilt feelings, and the 
fear of supernatural sanctions," social sanctions include 
"face-to-face approval and disapproval, ostracism, conformity 
pressure, shame and pride" (Campbell, 1982, 434).  While 
internal sanctions such as guilt requires only one's own 
knowledge of one's behavior, external sanctions require 
knowledge by others of one's behavior.  Despite difficulties 
in monitoring the turnout of others, anecdotal and polling 
evidence provides some indication that interpersonal pressures 
to vote are worthy of further investigation.  If the fear of 
shame and ostracism can induce men to fight in battles (Keegan, 
1976), surely it can be strong enough to induce them to vote.  
In an ABC-Harvard poll conducted in 1983 (Alderman, 1983), 37 
percent of respondents--including 41 percent of regular 
voters--cited as a reason for voting the statement: "My friends 
and relatives almost always vote and I'd feel uncomfortable 
telling them I hadn't voted."
iii
  
 Previous models of interpersonal pressures to vote 
(Uhlaner, 1989b; Schram, 1989; Coleman, 1990) are based on group 
or partisan norms.  High turnout among group members benefits 
them by helping to elect the group's favored candidates; social 
pressures arise to limit free rider behavior harmful to the 
group.   
 Social pressures may also be derived from civic duty.  In 
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this view, persons with particularly intense feelings of 
loyalty and obligation to society, or who are especially 
well-socialized, "enforce" voting norms through their 
willingness to express disapproval at non-voting.  Social 
sanctions thus permit a certain amount of "substitutability" 
of feelings of duty, as someone with a low sense of civic 
obligation may nonetheless vote to avoid displeasing a friend 
or relative with a stronger sense of duty.  For the individual, 
then, voter participation is a function of one's own sense of 
duty, of the strength of duty of one's family, friends, and other 
associates, and of the frequency and quality of interaction with 
these potential enforcers.  The relevance of social sanctions 
for an individual requires  that he associates with at least 
some high-duty persons whose respect he values. 
 There is little or no solid evidence in the turnout 
literature that interpersonal pressures matter.  Cassel and 
Hill (1981, 193) briefly outline a "peer interaction" theory 
of turnout but concede that it "cannot be tested at present 
because relevant survey data do not exist."  They overlook 
items included in selected NES surveys that provide some support 
for the importance of external sanctions.  In addition to this 
NES data, this section also presents evidence from a 1990 
post-election "Social Sanctions Survey" of Prince George's 
County, Maryland, and Shelby County, Tennessee residents, 
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conducted by the author, which focused on interpersonal 
pressures to vote.
iv
            
 Married persons are almost invariably found to vote more 
than single, separated, or widowed persons (e.g., Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone, 1980; Teixeira, 1987).  Wolfinger and Rosenstone 
(1980, 44) cite marriage as "by far the most important source" 
of interpersonal influence on turnout decisions.  There may 
also be economies of scale in information and transportation 
associated with marriage, however: "those who are married and 
living with their spouses can share the physical costs of voting 
(like registering and traveling to the polling booth), as well 
as the task of deciding between candidates" (Teixeira, 1987, 
23).  No attempts have been made to separate the cost-reducing 
and interpersonal effects of marital status.  
 NES surveys routinely inquire about the education of the 
respondent's spouse.  The probability of the respondent voting 
varies positively with the spouse's education.  This result 
appears to be consistent with either of the proposed arguments: 
a highly-educated spouse is likely to have a strong sense of 
duty and thereby influence the respondent's decision to vote, 
but having a well-educated and informed spouse may also lower 
one's costs of registering and locating the polling place.  The 
latter case is undermined, however, by Nagler's (1991) 
discovery that the deterrent effect of registration barriers 
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is not correlated with education, as had been previously 
believed due to flawed methodology (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 
1980).    
Further evidence of the impact of external sanctions 
associated with marriage is obtained using a more direct 
approach in the Social Sanctions Survey (SSS).  To determine 
one's general willingness to enforce voting norms, respondents 
were asked in the survey whether, upon discovering that a friend 
did not vote in the election, (1) "I would disapprove, and let 
him or her know," (2) "I would disapprove, and keep it to 
myself," or if (3) "It wouldn't matter to me at all."  Married 
respondents were asked whether or not their spouse had voted.  
The choice of option (1), the "enforcement" option, is 
associated with an average 21-percentage point increase in the 
probability of reporting that one's spouse had voted, or would 
vote.  Of course, disapproving respondents may be exaggerating 
the likelihood of their spouse voting.  A similar degree of 
overreporting should be associated with the choice of option 
(2) however, which also indicated disapproval of non-voting.  
But passive disapproval is associated with only a (not 
statistically significant) 12-point increase in reported 
voting of spouses.  The high potential among marriage partners 
for active disapproval of the violation of voting norms appears 
to account for the major portion of the marital status-turnout 
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connection.    
 Residential mobility has a strong effect on turnout, as 
the likelihood of one voting increases with length of residence 
at one's current address (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980).  
Mobility has been regarded as an important indicator of social 
connectedness (Crewe et. al., 1977; Conway, 1985; Pomper and 
Sernekos, 1989).  It is usually interpreted as a cost variable, 
however (Silver, 1973; Cassel and Hill, 1981); movers must learn 
where and how to re-register and to vote.  Squire, Wolfinger, 
and Glass (1987) find that the effect of mobility is not 
consistently and significantly lower among survey respondents 
residing in states allowing election-day registration, i.e., 
those states in which the cost effects of mobility should be 
lowest.  This result indicates that mobility may not be solely 
a cost variable, but provides no direct evidence for the 
importance of social pressures from neighbors and neighborhood 
institutions to vote. 
 Neighborhood influences on turnout can be more directly 
studied using the Major Panel of the 1980 NES survey, which 
includes a set of questions designed to probe the political 
effects of respondents' interactions with their neighbors 
(Eulau and Rothenberg, 1986, 130).  Eulau and Rothenberg (1986) 
found these interactions to have only modest effects on voter 
choices between candidates, but did not examine neighborhood 
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influences on the decision to vote or abstain.  
 Major Panel respondents were asked to list up to three 
people "living in this neighborhood with whom you or your family 
get together."  Not all respondents were able to list three; 
22 percent replied that they did not associate with any of their 
neighbors.  Respondents were asked whether, they, in general, 
agreed with each of these neighbors on politics, and also were 
asked which candidate each neighbor planned to vote for; some 
respondents volunteered that a particular neighbor did not plan 
to vote.  The probability of the respondent voting is found to 
increase by an average of about 3.5 percentage points for each 
neighbor cited who is expected to vote, and who generally agrees 
with the respondent politically.    
 Other neighborhood level indicators increasing the 
probability of voting include attending church in one's 
neighborhood (by an average 6 percentage points, and the 
presence of a Democratic or Republican party organization in 
the neighborhood (7.5 percentage points).  Independently of 
these neighborhood variables, residing at one's current address 
one year or less reduces the probability of voting by about 9.5 
percentage points.   
 In the SSS respondents claiming to "know and occasionally 
talk to" three or more people in their neighborhoods are 
significantly more likely to have voted than those knowing two 
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or fewer.  With this "knows-one's-neighbors variable included 
in the turnout regression, length of residence is not 
statistically significant.      
 Two summary measures of respondents' sense of civic duty 
to vote and subjectivity to social sanctions are found to be 
the most powerful predictors of turnout in the SSS.  
Respondents indicating it is "very important" to "still go out 
to vote" even if "your candidate or party doesn't have any chance 
of winning" were coded as high civic duty (70 percent of the 
sample).  Respondents were divided into high and low social 
sanctions categories by "yes" (42 percent) or "no" replies to 
the question: "Do you have any friends, neighbors, or relatives 
who would be disappointed or angry with you if they knew you 
had not voted in this year's elections?"   
 
IV. Turnout as Socially Cooperative Behavior  
 An ideal data set would include, in addition to the NES 
independent or causal variables influencing turnout, data on 
"co-dependent" variables, i.e., other forms of social 
cooperation.  The view of voting turnout as norm-governed 
behavior in a collective action setting would be further 
supported by evidence that voters were, for example, less likely 
to commit crimes and more likely to use their turn signals in 
traffic than were nonvoters.  Results from the Social Sanctions 
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Survey and the 1972 NES, as well as several sources of aggregate 
data, provide some support for this view. 
 Tyler (1990) summarizes evidence indicating that 
compliance with laws is influenced at least as much by feelings 
of obligation and peer disapproval as by the threat of legal 
sanctions.  At the state level, the crime rate is inversely 
correlated with turnout (r = -.43).  The correlation 
coefficient between turnout and crime is -.30 at the 
neighborhood level in the District of Columbia.
v
  
 The 1990 census mail response rates by state are correlated 
even more highly with turnout (r = .56) than are crime rates.  
The Social Sanctions Survey establishes this turnout-census 
response relationship at the individual level, with voting in 
past presidential elections and in the 1990 mid-term election 
both correlated with having mailed in the census form.   
 State-level data on charitable contributions is not 
available.  The SSS links charitable giving and voter 
participation at the individual level, however:  contributions 
are correlated with having voted in the 1990 elections and with 
past presidential voting.  As with voting, charitable giving 
and responding to the census are associated in the SSS with items 
measuring sense of loyalty or indebtedness to society, sense 
of obligation to vote, enforcement of voting norms, and the 
summary social sanctions indicator.   
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 The 1972 NES asked respondents about their membership and 
activity in various types of organizations.  Turnout is 
correlated as or more strongly with activity in the PTA (r = 
.144), civic groups generally (.117), neighborhood 
associations (.084), and charitable organizations (.079), than 
with involvement in political organizations (.100), business 
organizations (.086), and special interest groups (.070).
vi
   
 
V. The American Turnout Decline  
 The low turnout in 20th century U.S. national elections 
compared to 19th century elections, or to elections in other 
present-day democracies, has been convincingly attributed to 
legal and institutional differences (Piven and Cloward, 1988; 
Kleppner, 1982).  A legal-institutional approach fails to 
account for the more moderate but sizeable post-1960 turnout 
decline, however. This period has witnessed the removal of many 
barriers to registration and voting.  Poll taxes and literacy 
tests have been eliminated, mail-in registration for all 
eligible voters has been introduced in nearly half of the 
states, election-day polling hours have been lengthened, and 
absentee voting eligibility has been broadened.  Residency 
requirements have been drastically reduced in most states, and 
the period before election day in which the registration books 
are closed has been shortened in many states.  Yet, turnout in 
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presidential elections has steadily declined from about 63 
percent in 1960 to about 50 percent in 1988.  
 Perhaps the most commonly advanced explanation of the 
turnout decline is voter cynicism and disillusionment generated 
by Vietnam and Watergate, the rise of PACs, and negative 
campaigning.  Analyses of NES data typically show little or no 
relationship between turnout and measures of political cynicism 
and trust in government, however.  Furthermore, while the 
number of NES respondents indicating they trusted the 
government and believed it is run "for the benefit of all the 
people" fell drastically at about the time of Watergate, there 
was no clear trend either before or since the mid-1970s (Miller 
and Traugott, 1989).  
 In contrast to the measure of trust in government, an 
indicator of trust in people is highly correlated 
cross-sectionally with turnout.  Agreement with the statement 
"most people can be trusted" increases the probability of voting 
by 6.5 percentage points on average, relative to the reference 
attitude that "you can't be too careful in dealing with people."  
Trust in government, on the other hand, has no effect on turnout.   
 Furthermore, trust in people has the right time trend: 
Americans are becoming more mistrustful of their fellow 
citizens.  In all three polls (including NES and other surveys) 
conducted in the 1960's that asked this question, at least 53 
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percent of respondents agreed that people were generally 
trustworthy.  In the 17 surveys conducted since 1970, the 
figure reached as high as 51 percent only once (in 1976), and 
has often dipped into the upper thirties (Niemi, Mueller, and 
Smith, 1989).  The relationship between turnout and trust in 
people suggests that for many citizens, voting may be governed 
in part by "conditional cooperation": they will themselves 
vote, refrain from littering, etc., if and only if "enough" 
others are doing their fair share of public-interested acts 
(Hardin, 1982, ch. 6).  The presence of a sufficient number of 
conditional cooperators can create the potential for a 
snowballing effect on turnout of a small initial decline in 
feelings of civic duty, or in interpersonal pressures to vote.      
  There is a consensus in studies of recent turnout decline 
that another attitudinal variable of paramount importance in 
cross-individual analysis has not contributed to the turnout 
decline: "although feelings of civic duty are consistently and 
strongly related to turnout, there has been no decline in such 
feelings" (Abramson and Aldrich, 1982, 504; also see Cassel and 
Hill, 1981, 183).  
 Civic duty has been dismissed too easily, however. It did 
fall slightly between 1960 and 1980 (Miller and Traugott, 1989, 
284), when 3 of the 4 duty items in the NES were dropped from 
the survey.  Even assuming that strength of civic duty has 
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remained roughly constant since 1960, and that this implies duty 
played no part in the turnout drop, it is puzzling why civic 
duty did not strengthen significantly over the period, as would 
be expected from the enormous rise in average education of the 
American citizenry over this period.  Miller (1980, 29) more 
than a decade ago argued that trends already underway in the 
age distribution, education, income, and occupation "may be 
expected to enhance citizens' sense of civic obligation" and 
thereby "produce an increase in voting turnout."  
 Finally, the impact of a given level of citizen duty on 
turnout may vary across individuals and over time, as external 
sanctions associated with violation of the duty to vote may 
vary.  Miller (1980, 20) finds "the decline in election day 
voting has been concentrated very disproportionately in those 
sectors of the electorate in which one has always found the least 
political interest and a lack of sense of civic virtue" 
(emphasis in original).  This pattern is exactly what would be 
expected if there were reduced interpersonal pressure to vote 
resulting from weakened attachments to family, neighbors, and 
community institutions such as churches, political parties, and 
other voluntary organizations.  People who vote primarily 
because of the expectations of others rather than because of 
an internally-felt obligation will be those most likely to drop 
out of the electorate when the expectations of others begin to 
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matter less.   
 When social pressure to vote is considered, the 
relationship between civic duty and the decision to vote becomes 
less simple than assumed in the standard literature.  
Individual A may vote in one election and fail to vote in the 
next one because of a weakened sense of duty--but it may be 
individual B's duty that weakened.  Alternatively, A and B may 
both have an unchanged sense of duty between the two elections, 
but B has moved 2000 miles away, sparing A the choice between 
bearing the costs of voting or incurring B's disapproval.  
  If significant external sanctions are associated with 
civic duty, as argued above, a weakening of attachments to 
family and community in the U.S. may contribute to turnout 
decline.  Where social networks are less dense, establishing 
and maintaining sanctioning systems for norm conformity is more 
problematic (Coleman, 1990, ch. 11).  Civic duty may thus be 
responsible for attracting many fewer voters to the polls -- 
even if the strength of civic duty itself has not declined 
overall -- when the importance of social pressures to vote is 
recognized.  Anecdotal and statistical evidence indicates a 
general weakening of social attachments has occurred in the U.S. 
in recent years.  It is often lamented that many Americans no 
longer know their neighbors.  Declining fertility and 
increased female labor force participation have reduced the 
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opportunities for social interaction within neighborhoods.    
 Membership in church-affiliated group has fallen from 42 
percent of General Social Survey respondents in 1974, when the 
question was first asked, to 30 percent in 1987.  The number 
of subjects claiming no memberships in any of the various groups 
inquired about in the GSS rose from 25 percent in 1974 to 32 
percent in 1987 (Niemi, Mueller, and Smith, 1989).    
 Marital status also has been shown to play a part in the 
downward voting trend. The rise in number of people remaining 
single has been shown to contribute to the 1960-1980 turnout 
decline by Teixeira (1987, 73).  In 1960, 80 percent of NES 
respondents were married and living with their spouses; this 
figure had dropped to 61 percent by 1980 and to 54.7 percent 
by 1988.  Census figures show a rise in the number of adults 
who are single, separated, or widowed from 28.3 percent in 1970 
to 37.3 percent in 1988 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990). 
 Declining social connectedness may influence the strength 
of internal, as well as external, pressures to vote.  There is 
reason to believe that high postwar mobility rates, along with 
other social structural changes, have diminished the incentives 
of parents and other adult relatives to socialize their children 
to behave in socially approved ways: 
 
"Any aspect of social structure which reduces the degree 
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to which the child's later actions will benefit or harm 
the family's interests (such as residence in a more 
anonymous urban setting as compared to a small-town 
setting, or geographic mobility and discontinuity in 
family life) should weaken the relation between the 
family's interest in its status and the degree to which 
socialization practices incorporate internal sanctions. 
Thus, as these conditions proliferate...persons in future 
generations will be decreasingly socialized (Coleman, 
1990, 298)."  
 
This argument may be a partial solution to the case of the 
missing duty discussed above.     
      The decline of the extended family, and even of the 
nuclear family with rises in the divorce rate and the labor force 
participation rate of mothers, may contribute to weakened 
socialization of civic responsibilities and partisanship.  As 
Urie Bronfenbrenner argues (Woodward and Malamud, 1975):  
 
"In recent decades a number of developments--many 
themselves beneficent--have conspired to isolate the 
family and to reduce drastically the number of relatives, 
neighbors and other caring adults who used to share in the 
socialization of American children." 
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Even as recently as 1970, only 14.8 percent of children under 
18--11.5% of whites, and 41.5% of blacks--did not live with two 
parents.  In 1988, the comparable figure was 27.3 
percent--21.1% of whites, and 61.4% of blacks (U.S. Bureau of 
the Census, 1990).  In 1960, only 18.6 percent of married 
mothers with children under 6 worked outside the home; this 
figure increased to over 57 percent by 1988 (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, 1990).  Many children from these one-parent or 
two-worker households have entered the voting-age population 
in recent years.  
 When an individual's socializing agents are incongruent 
in their party loyalties, the individual's strength of 
partisanship tends to be weakened.  A group- or partisan-based 
voting norm "should become weaker as the political bias of 
voter's association declines" (Coleman, 1990, 828).  In 1970 
only 18 percent of children surveyed reported having parents 
who disagreed in their partisanship; by 1980 one-third said they 
came from such politically split families (Brown, 1988, 113).  
 Abramson and Aldrich (1982, 507) find weakened party 
identification accounts for 2.5 percentage points of the total 
10.2 percentage point decline in presidential voting between 
1960 and 1980 (also see Cassel and Hill, 1981; and Teixeira, 
1987, ch. 4).  High post-war mobility rates and changing family 
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structure may provide part of the explanation for the 
partisanship decline.  
 It is difficult to construct a satisfactory empirical test 
of the causes of turnout decline: there is little or no time 
series data on interpersonal pressures to vote.  To the extent 
that diminishing social sanctions for nonvoting are not 
captured due to lack of data availability (e.g., on the reduced 
presence of extended family members), the portion of the recent 
American turnout decline unaccounted for by the usual models 
should be growing over time.  Teixeira (1987) discovers 
precisely this pattern (using NES data), and is able to offer 
little speculation as to its cause. 
 
VI. The Erosion of Social Cooperation 
     Certain time-series data on other forms of socially 
cooperative behavior in the U.S. offer further support for the 
view that the turnout drop has been caused in large part by a 
weakening of social norms and associated internal and external 
sanctions, rather than by narrowly political causes such as 
cynicism and disillusionment associated with Watergate and 
other events.    
 The census mail-in response rate fell from about 75 percent 
in 1980 to about 63 percent in 1990, a drop that surprised Census 
Bureau officials, requiring much larger field enumeration 
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efforts than anticipated.   
 Controlling for other factors known to influence voter 
participation, residing in a jurisdiction selecting jurors from 
voter registration lists reduces the probability of being 
registered to vote by 9 percentage points on average.  There 
is some evidence that this deterrent impact on voter 
participation of choosing jurors from registration lists has 
grown over time; more citizens are evading one civic obligation 
to escape another than in previous times (Knack, 1991).  
 Fewer Americans read a daily newspaper (Teixeira, 1987) 
or watch national news programs on television than formerly.  
Daily newspaper readership fell to 51 percent of adults in 1988 
from 73 percent in 1967 (Niemi, Mueller, and Smith, 1989).  The 
combined Nielsen rating of the three major networks' evening 
news programs is down by about 25 percent from its levels of 
only 10 years ago (Nielsen Media Research, 1990).  Only a small 
fraction of the ratings decline in network news viewing is 
attributable to increased viewing of cable news programs. 
 Controlling for personal income, age distribution, stock 
prices, and political climate, a time trend variable is found 
by Nelson (1986) to have "a strong independent and statistically 
significant" downward effect on charitable contributions.  The 
effect of the time trend variable accounts for an annual rate 
of decline of 3.6 percent in giving over the 1948-1982 period.  
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Nelson's model does not include tax inducement variables, 
however, so that any changes in the tax price of giving are 
reflected in his time trend variable.  Two studies by Feldstein 
(1975, 1976) using independent data sets find time trend 
variables remain significant in models containing tax price 
variables, with an annual decline in the propensity to give of 
1.4 percent over the 1948-1968 period, and an average decline 
of between 1 percent and 1.8 percent per year from 1962 to 1970. 
Furthermore, Nelson finds an acceleration in the annual rate 
of decrease over the 1948-1982 period: the coefficient on a 
time-squared variable indicates a rate of decline for the 
beginning year of 3.58 percent and a fall for the final year 
of 5.14 percent.  This acceleration is difficult to explain in 
terms of changing tax inducements or "crowding-out" effects 
associated with increases in the charitable role of government.    
 Finally, the fall in turnout is consistent with widespread 
impressions of a decline in "common" courtesy, and of more 
frequent violations of driver etiquette, with an observed 
increase in the selfishness of professional and college 
athletes in team sports (Boswell, 1989), and with a "decline 
of comity in Congress."  A study of that title (Uslaner, 1991) 
finds that year-to-year variations in measures of congressional 
amending activity are significantly correlated with 
year-to-year variations in charitable giving and trust in 
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people, and attributes the downward trend in these and other 
indicators to the general decline of reciprocity in America.  
 Each of the areas of social cooperation cited here can of 
course be explained in part by incentives and circumstances 
unique to each area of behavior, just as the turnout decline 
has been attributed to the effects of Vietnam and Watergate, 
the rise of PACs, negative campaigning, the poor quality of 
candidates, little differences between parties and candidates, 
and numerous other factors.  Just as several of these rather 
ad hoc political explanations may not be wholly irrelevant to 
an explanation of the turnout decline, other ad hoc theories 
can no doubt be provided to explain trends in student cheating, 
census response rates, and driver courtesy.  The 
"sociological" explanation offered here possesses the virtues 
of power and parsimony: it explains a lot with a little, relative 
to its opposition.  With the exception of norm-based sanctions, 
these various collective action settings have few costs and 
benefits in common to account for correlations observed across 
units or over time.           
 
VII. Conclusion        
 There is a popular tendency to speak of shifting "values" 
as if tastes and preferences were undergoing a widespread and 
autonomous change. Indeed, it is often argued that 
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civic-mindedness or selflessness is cyclical, and that it is 
only a matter of time before cooperation is in vogue again. In 
spite of periodic attempts in the media to proclaim an end to 
the era of selfishness (e.g., Barol, 1988), the "Me Decade" of 
the 1970's has become the "Me Generation," with few current 
signs of a reversion to greater selflessness.   
 Rather than resorting to tastes and "fads" to explain 
behavior, the argument here stresses primarily changing 
incentives and opportunities to behave selfishly (versus 
cooperatively), and secondarily changing incentives and 
opportunities for parents and other socializing agents to 
invest in shaping the values of children. 
     As residents of large and mobile societies find themselves 
in fewer repeated interactions with others, the benefits of 
following rules of thumb that prescribe cooperation are 
diminished.  The advantages of acting in accordance with the 
"Golden Rule" are less apparent when others rarely have the 
opportunity to "do unto you."  
 According to Coleman (1990, 301): 
 
"...social changes have moved modern society toward a 
structure in which individuals act more independently than 
they did in the past, in which individuals' goals are more 
independently arrived at than they were in the past, and 
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in which individuals' interests are more self-directed 
than they were in the past."  
 
 McKean (1974, 214) argues of changes in social variables 
reducing cooperative behavior: 
 
"They do not change our taste for morality or a behavioral 
code; they simply make it more costly and less rewarding 
to each individual to be considerate of others, and to 
adhere to customs or ethical rules." 
 
Buchanan (1978, 367) attributes a reduction in the constraining 
effect of moral rules to population increase, mobility, and 
urbanization:  
 
"Add to this the observed erosion of the family, the 
church, and the law--all of which were stabilizing 
influences that tend to reinforce moral precepts--and we 
readily understand why "Homo economicus" has assumed such 
a dominant role in modern behavior patterns." 
 
Voting turnout thus appears to be merely an example of a class 
of collective action settings in which people cooperate more 
than economic theory predicts that they should--but in which 
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behavior corresponds more closely to that theory than it used 
to. 
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Notes  
i. See Mueller (1989) for a review of work in each of these areas. 
ii. For example, see Verba and Nie (1972).  A more extensive 
critique than that presented here of the standard approach to 
political participation is contained in Uhlaner (1986).  
iii. In the same poll, 55 percent, including 71 percent of 
regular voters, identified with the statement "if I didn't vote, 
I'd feel guilty." 
iv
. Details of results cited here can be found in chapter 4 of 
Knack (1991).  
v. Knack (1990a). The 180 D.C. census tracts were matched with 
the 140 voting precincts to form 54 "neighborhoods."    
vi. Each of these relationships is statistically significant 
at the .001 level (N = 2133).  
